Patrick VILLIEU

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In this paper, we challenge the claim that a conservative central bank strengthens the likelihood of a conservative government. In contrast, if an election is based on the comparative advantages of the candidates, an inflation-averse central banker can deter the chances of a conservative candidate because once inflation is removed, its comparative advantage in the fight against inflation disappears. We develop a theory based on a policy-mix game with electoral competition, predicting that a tighter monetary policy reduces the chances of a conservative (i.e., inflation-adverse) party while enhancing the chances for a liberal party. To test these predictions, we examine monthly data of British political history between 1987 and 2015, and show that an increase in the interest rate in the 10 months preceding a national election decreases the popularity of a Tory government. Our analysis on a panel of six OECD countries reveals that a pre-election increase of 1 percentage point in the main targeted interest rate rises the popularity of liberal parties by around 3.43 percentage points relative to its trend.

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L’introduction générale au numéro spécial de la RFE, revient sur les grands enjeux liés à la soutenabilité de la dette publique d’une part, et à l’identification d’une combinaison optimale entre politique budgétaire et politique monétaire, d’autre part. À cette occasion, les conditions nécessaires à la soutenabilité de la dette publique sont évoquées, aussi bien pour les pays riches que pour les pays pauvres d’Afrique. La « borne inférieure de taux d’intérêt », qui a prévalu de 2009 à 2020, ayant conduit à la dominance budgétaire, est à l’origine de l’assignation de la politique monétaire à l’objectif intermédiaire de l’endettement public. Il en est résulté une tolérance inflationniste plus grande à partir de 2021, suite aux crises imprévisibles de la Covid-19 et la guerre russoukrainienne. Il en découle la nécessité de redéployer les dispositifs des politiques budgétaire et monétaire, afin d’éviter d’étouffer la croissance, tout en combattant l’inflation. Cette introduction examine les différentes options possibles, dont les réformes des règles budgétaires, le verdissement de la politique monétaire et la coordination budgétaire verticale. Successivement, la contribution des auteurs à ce numéro spécial est évaluée.

Abstract Few studies have focused specifically on the physiocratic analysis of money. The physiocrats' position was based on their criticism of Law's system and more broadly on the role of finance. First, they rejected the idea that a large amount of money was the condition for the wealth of nations. Second, they rejected paper money, as well as any form of currency alteration. As a simple means of exchange, Quesnay and his followers recognized that money could be replaced by paper. However, in order to comply with the “value for equal value” principle of exchange, money had to be made of precious metals, as Le Trosne, the main architect of the physiocratic monetary doctrine, forcefully asserted. This doctrine of money created a tension: from the circulation perspective, money was not considered as a component of wealth and could be replaced by paper to simply represent flows in expenditure; but from the equality-of-exchange perspective, money had to be made of precious metals, thus becoming a storable asset in a portfolio. To overcome this tension, the économistes were to forcefully denounce hoarding and deny money the function of a store of value.

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This paper investigates the relationship between public debt and environmental debt—reflecting CO carbon concentration. First, using an endogenous growth model in which pollution abatement spending can be financed by public debt, we show that public debt and environmental debt are complementary in the long run and usually substitutes in the short run. Second, these predictions are empirically confirmed: in particular, a 1% increase in the public debt ratio leads to an increase of 0.74% in cumulative CO per capita in the long run. Our findings emphasize the difficulty of defining policies that jointly serve both the economic (fiscal) and the environmental goals, due to the short- and long-run conflicting environmental effects of policies that either reduce or do not constrain public debt.

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Abstract We analyze the channels through which institutional quality can impact the corruption–growth nexus. To do this, we develop an endogenous growth model and test its implications empirically, through panel data models using GMM and PSTR settings. Our sample consists of 136 developed and developing countries analyzed over the period 1984–2015. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that (i) the corruption–growth relation can be subject to nonlinearities highly influenced by countries’ institutional development; and (ii) private investment and public spending are two main channels through which institutional quality affects, positively or negatively, the relation between corruption and economic growth.

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Ten years after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, most advanced economies have recovered and global economic growth has taken hold. However, partly due to accommodative financial conditions, financial risks are on the rise while inflation remains subdued. This revives the debate on the role of monetary policy in containing financial risks. This paper provides a framework to investigate trade-offs between macroeconomic and financial stability when the central bank has a financial stability objective. Relying on a New Keynesian model with an endogenous financial bubble, our simulations suggest that a central bank attempting to “lean against the wind” may face trade-offs between inflation/output stability and financial stability. We therefore argue that the interest rate should be used for achieving traditional macroeconomic goals, and a second, macroprudential instrument should complement the policy rate to tackle financial risk accumulation.

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This paper develops an original analysis of deficit monetization in a growth model with transaction costs, in which economic growth interacts with productive public expenditures. This interaction generates two positive balanced growth paths (BGP) in the long run: a high BGP and a low BGP. The transitional dynamics show that multiplicity cannot be rejected if transaction costs affect both consumption and investment expenditures, with possible indeterminacy of the high BGP. Importantly, deficit monetization is shown to reduce the parameter space producing indeterminacy.

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Most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, with limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets. Consequently, they are amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing, namely seigniorage and deforestation revenues. First, we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Second, a panel-data econometric analysis over the 1990–2010 period confirms our findings. Consequently, a tighter monetary policy hastens deforestation. Third, we extend the theoretical model and show that international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between tighter monetary policies and deforestation, and then discuss the relevance of this finding with respect to recent institutional arrangements.

The endogenous growth literature established the existence of an inverted-U curve between taxes and economic growth, namely a Growth Laffer Curve, but empirical evidence on this relationship in developing countries is rather limited. Given that seigniorage and public debt are also important means of financing public spending in these countries, we take into account in this paper their respective impacts on growth, as they might deform the existing relationship between taxes and growth. To this end, we develop a growth model with public investment as the engine of perpetual growth, and look for the effect of debt, tax and money financing on economic growth. We study in particular the way fiscal and monetary policies deform the Growth Laffer Curve in developing countries. An empirical section based on a panel of 100 developing countries over the period 1980–2010 provides both OLS-Fixed Effects and GMM-system estimations that support our theoretical conclusions, namely the existence of Growth Laffer Curves indexed by the levels of debt and of seigniorage.

In a very interesting endogenous growth model, Futagami, Iwaisako, and Ohdoi [Macroeconomic Dynamics 12 (2008), 445-462] study the long-run growth effect of borrowing for public investment. Their model exhibits (i) the ltiplicity of balanced growth paths (BGPs) in the long run (two steady states) and (ii) a possible indeterminacy of the transition path to the high-growth BGP. The goal of this note is to show that their results depend on a sharp assumption, namely the definition of the public debt target as a ratio to private capital. If the target is defined in terms of public debt-to-GDP ratio, both results vanish: the model exhibits a unique BGP (no multiplicity) and the adjustment path to this unique equilibrium is determinate (no indeterminacy).

Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons aux effets des déficits publics sur la croissance, dans un modèle de croissance endogène avec investissement public pouvant être financé par impôt ou dette publique. Nous nous focalisons sur la croissance de long terme et étudions la manière dont des déficits persistants influencent la croissance. Nous montrons que ces déficits réduisent toujours la croissance à long terme, indépendamment des règles budgétaires adoptées par le gouvernement.

This paper studies monetary and fiscal policies in an endogenous growth model with transaction costs. We show that the relation between long-run economic growth and both monetary and fiscal policies is subject to threshold effects, a result that gives account of a number of recent empirical findings. Furthermore, the model shows that, to finance public expenditures, growth-maximizing governments must choose relatively high seigniorage (respectively income taxation), if “institutional quality” and “financial development” indicators are low (respectively high). Thus, our model may explain why some governments resort to seigniorage and inflationary finance, and others rather resort to high tax rates, as a result of growthmaximizing strategies in different structural environments (notably concerning institutional and financial development contexts). In addition, the model allows examining how the optimal mix of government finance changes in response to different public debt contexts. A short empirical section confirms our theoretical results.

Dans les analyses empiriques, la " qualité institutionnelle " semble être une variable déterminante pour établir le sens de la relation entre finance et croissance. Ainsi, Demetriades & Law (2004) montrent que le développement financier exerce un effet favorable sur la croissance lorsque les institutions sont saines, alors que cette corrélation disparaît si les institutions sont altérées. Dans cet article, nous tentons de reproduire ce fait saillant dans un modèle de croissance endogène. Dans notre modèle, lorsque la qualité institutionnelle dépasse un certain seuil, la relation entre finance et croissance est positive, alors qu'en deçà du seuil, elle devient négative. Ce résultat s'explique de la manière suivante : le développement financier abaisse les coûts de transaction sur l'investissement privé, mais réduit également les recettes de seigneuriage utilisables pour les investissements publics. Par conséquent, il est favorable à la croissance seulement si d'autres recettes publiques peuvent être utilisées pour financer les investissements publics, donc si la qualité institutionnelle est suffisante pour permettre de collecter des impôts autrement que par taxe inflationniste. Au contraire, si la qualité institutionnelle est trop faible, la perte de recettes de seigneuriage ne peut être compensée par la collecte de nouveaux impôts, et les infrastructures nécessaires au développement ne peuvent être programmées.

Nous proposons un modèle théorique simple permettant de prendre en compte l'existence de régimes d'endettement de long terme, en accord avec les faits saillants observés en longue période. Nous nous intéressons particulièrement aux effets d'une hausse permanente de la dette publique sur la croissance à long terme, et nous montrons que ces effets, toujours négatifs (on nuls), dépendent dans leur ampleur de la variable d'ajustement à la charge de la dette dans la contrainte budgétaire de l'Etat. Enfin, nous montrons qu'au contraire des effets sur la croissance, les effets sur le bien-être à long terme d'une hausse permanente de la dette publique peuvent être positifs. Nous en déduisons l'existence d'un seuil optimal pour le ratio de dette publique au PIB.

We correct an error in [Greiner, A., Semmler, W., 2000. Endogenous growth, government debt and budgetary regimes. Journal of Macroeconomics 22, 363-384] concerning the effect of different debt rules on long term economic growth. We focus on Proposition1 stating that, in some cases, using deficits to finance productive public expenditures, may raise long term economic growth. We propose an analytical proof, showing that the cases in which deficits raise the balanced growth path imply Ponzi games and are, therefore, infeasible. Consequently, using deficits to finance public investment is always detrimental to economic growth in the long-run in their model.

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Depuis le modèle de Barro (1990), la littérature théorique met en évidence l'existence d'une relation en cloche entre impôt et croissance économique, dans l'esprit de la « courbe de Laffer ». Cependant, les évidences empiriques semblent réfuter une telle relation. Nous montrons que ce hiatus disparaît lorsque l'on prend en compte l'effet des déficits publics. En effet, l?indexation de la relation impôt-croissance par le ratio de déficit public permet de réconcilier les données avec les travaux théoriques mettant en évidence une « courbe de Laffer de croissance »

Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle théorique simple dans lequel l'impact du déficit budgétaire sur les dépenses publiques d'investissement dépend du niveau de dette publique (en pourcentage du PIB). Lorsque la dette publique est faible, l'impact du déficit est positif, car la charge de la dette peut être absorbée par une diminution des dépenses de consommation. Lorsque la dette est très élevée, en revanche, il n'est plus possible de réduire les dépenses de consommation, et l'ajustement s'opère par les dépenses d'investissement, de sorte que la relation entre déficit et dépenses publiques d'investissement devient négative. Une analyse empirique menée dans un modèle économétrique avec effets de seuil en panel sur 22 pays de l'OCDE vient confirmer cette non linéarité.

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DR LEO - Working paper 2022-03

In this paper, we challenge the claim that an independent conservative central bank strengthens the likelihood of a conservative government. In contrast, if an election is based on the comparative advantages of the candidates, an inflation-averse central banker can deter the chances of a conservative candidate because once inflation is removed, its comparative advantage in the fight against inflation disappears. We develop a theory based on a policy-mix game with electoral competition, predicting that the chances of a conservative (i.e., inflation-averse) party is reduced in the presence of tighter monetary policy. To test this prediction, we examine monthly data of British political history between 1960 and 2015. We show that a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate in the 10 months prior to a national election decreases the popularity of a Tory government by approximately 0.75 percentage points relative to its trend.

This paper develops a limit-cycle-based theory of debt fluctuations through a simple endogenous growth model. Public debt and deficit are introduced by relaxing the balanced-budget rule hypothesis, and assuming a simple fiscal rule. Our main result is that fiscal rules can be destabilizing, leading to (i) multiple equilibria-four balanced-growth paths can emerge-, (ii) endogenous public debt cycles, which appear both in the short and the long run, and (iii) hysteresis phenomena arising from extreme sensitivity of changes in parameters. We also reveal that a balanced-budget rule does not preclude large aggregate fluctuations. Finally, our calibration exercise highlights that our model produces asymmetric cycles consistent with observed stylized facts.

Pourquoi les politiciens ne résolvent-ils pas les problèmes socialement indésirables ? Une des raisons est que des politiciens peuvent être incités à ne pas résoudre les problèmes afin de conserver un avantage électoral. Cet article montre que, si la carrière des politiciens dépend des problèmes sociaux qu’ils savent résoudre avec compétence, les réformes qu’ils mettront en œuvre résulteront de l’arbitrage entre la réputation et la nécessité de garder les ennemis en vie.

In a seminal contribution, Guo and Harrison (2004, JET) showed that, under a balanced-budget rule, the neoclassical growth model exhibits saddle-path stability when the adjustment is based on wasteful public spending. The present paper challenges this result in an endogenous growth framework with non-trivial dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio. We show that the emergence of aggregate instability dramatically depends on the strength of social labor externalities. If the labor demand is positively sloped and steeper than the labor supply, two reachable balanced-growth paths appear-a no growth trap, and a positive growth solution-that gives birth to both local and global indeterminacy, hence aggregate instability driven by self-fulfilling beliefs (sunspots). In addition, we show that a fiscal rule such that the tax rate strongly responds to public-debt increases can remove the no-growth trap, and secure positive long-run growth. JEL classification: E62; O41

In a seminal contribution, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (JPE, 1997), showed that the balanced-budget rule (BBR) produces aggregate instability in an exogenous growth model with labor tax-based adjustment. The present paper challenges this result in an endogenous growth framework with a more general budget rule, involving deficit and debt in the long-run and making the BBR a special case. We show that the emergence of aggregate instability dramatically depends on the level of public spending. In particular, low public spending ensures determinacy. However, in the case of high public spending, multiplicity arises, with four potential equilibria: two high-growth BGPs, a low-growth trap, and a "catastrophic" equilibrium where the economy asymptotically collapses. In addition, when the ratio of public spending is sufficiently large, a subcritical Hopf bifurcation appears around the low-growth trap, giving rise to a homoclinic orbit going around the neighborhood of the catastrophic equilibrium. A calibration exercise confirms that these results are obtained for realistic values of parameters.

The article explores the relationship between public debt and environmental debt. The latter is defined as the difference between the "virgin state" which is the maximum stock of environmental quality that can be kept intact with natural regenerations and the current quality of the environment. A theoretical model of endogenous growth is built. We show that there is a unique well-determined balanced-growth path. The public debt and the environmental debt are substitute in the short-run but complementary in the long-run. Indeed, budget deficit provides additional resources to finance pollution abatement spending, but generate also unproductive expenditures (the debt burden). This hypothesis is tested on a sample of 22 countries for the period 1990-2011. The environmental debt is measured by the cumulative CO2 emissions per capita. We use panel time-series estimators which allow for heterogeneity in the slope coefficients between countries. It appears mainly that, in the long term, an increase of 100% in public debt ratio leads to an increase of 74% in cumulative CO2 per capita. In addition, this positive long-run relationship is still present at the country and the sub-sample level, despite some differences in the short-term dynamics.

The present paper develops a simple theoretical setup to examine the role of the tax-spending mix of fiscal adjustments on aggregate (in)stability in indebted economies. To this end, we build an AK endogenous growth model with public debt dynamics. If the adjustment of the government's budget constraint is based on a single instrument (taxes or public spending), the economy converges towards a high-growth path. With mixed adjustment, however, another equilibrium appears (the no-growth path) that can be locally over-determine (unstable) or under-determined (stable). A hopf bifurcation can occurs at the border between the last two cases, which leads to cyclical dynamics. We also show that global indeterminacy is likely to emerge if fiscal adjustment is mainly based on public spending. A calibration of the model shows that area of indeterminacy covers reasonable values for parameters.

In response to the Great Recession, Central Banks around the world adopted " unconven-tional " monetary policies. In particular, the Fed, and more recently the ECB, launched massive debt monetization programs. In this paper, we develop a formal analysis of the short-and long-run consequences of deficit and debt monetization, through an endoge-nous growth model in which economic growth interacts with productive public expenditure. This interaction can generate two positive balanced growth paths (BGP) in the long-run: a high BGP and a low BGP, and further, depending on the form of the CIA constraint, possible multiplicity and indeterminacy. Thus, monetizing deficits is found to be remarkably powerful. First, a large dose of monetization might allow avoiding, whenever present, BGP indeterminacy. Second, monetization always allows increasing growth and welfare along the (high) BGP, by weakening the debt burden in the long-run. Third, with a CIA on consumption only, monetization provides a rationale for deficits in the long-run: for high degrees of monetization, the impact of deficits and debts on economic growth and welfare becomes positive in the steady-state.

Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are very difficult to solve. Another one may be that Politicians have not the ability to solve difficult problems, i.e. they are “incompetent”. But there is another reason: Politicians sometimes lack the incentive to solve problems because of inefficiencies generated by electoral process in representative democracies. It is the case when Politicians have the incentive “to keep their enemies alive”, precisely because they are competent in solving the problem: once the problem removed, competent Politicians lose their electoral advantage. In this paper, we show that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians’ incentives not to address the problems. If the reputation of an incumbent Politician depends on the amount of reforms he implements, and positively affects his probability of being reelected, the trade-off between reputation and the “need for enemies” leads to an incomplete set of reforms, which can handle only a part of the problems. This mechanism might contribute to the explanation of the high degree of persistence of some social or economic diseases such as, specifically, public indebtedness.

Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are difficult to solve, or that Politicians are incompetent. But there is another reason: in representative democracies, competent Politicians sometimes lack the incentive to solve problems to keep their enemies alive, in order to conserve an electoral advantage. This paper shows that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians incentives not to address the problems. If the reputation of an incumbent Politician depends on the amount of reforms he implements, and positively affects his probability of being reelected, the trade-off between reputation and the need for enemies leads to an incomplete set of reforms, which can handle only a part of the problems. This mechanism might contribute to the explanation of the high degree of persistence of some social or economic diseases such as, specifically, public indebtedness.

The vampire metaphor has been used in numerous papers describing biological interactions between two populations. Such a metaphor translates well to a standard endogenous growth model with public debt. Public debt can be assimilated to a Vamp, whose blood-sucking behavior corresponds to the harmful effect of the debt burden on productive public expenditures. However, the complete destruction of public debt in the long-run is shown to be socially undesirable, because this would imply too much distortionary taxation, with damaging effects on the balanced growth path. By identifying ecological or biological processes with usual national account relationships, this analysis is one step further in the integration of macroeconomics and environmental economics.

In response to the Great Recession, Central Banks around the world adopted " unconven-tional " monetary policies. In particular, the Fed, and more recently the ECB, launched massive debt monetization programs. In this paper, we develop a formal analysis of the short-and long-run consequences of deficit and debt monetization, through an endoge-nous growth model in which economic growth interacts with productive public expenditure. This interaction can generate two positive balanced growth paths (BGP) in the long-run: a high BGP and a low BGP, and further, depending on the form of the CIA constraint, possible multiplicity and indeterminacy. Thus, monetizing deficits is found to be remarkably powerful. First, a large dose of monetization might allow avoiding, whenever present, BGP indeterminacy. Second, monetization always allows increasing growth and welfare along the (high) BGP, by weakening the debt burden in the long-run. Third, with a CIA on consumption only, monetization provides a rationale for deficits in the long-run: for high degrees of monetization, the impact of deficits and debts on economic growth and welfare becomes positive in the steady-state.

Most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, with limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets; consequently, they are amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing, namely seigniorage and deforestation revenues. First, we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Second, a panel-data econometric analysis over the 1990-2010 period confirms our findings. Consequently, a tighter monetary policy hastens deforestation. Third, we extend the theoretical model and show that international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between tighter monetary policies and deforestation, and then discuss the relevance of this finding with respect to recent institutional arrangements.

Avec la crise financière, les gouvernements des pays industrialisés ont lancé d'importants programmes de stimulation de la demande et ont été contraints à recapitaliser les banques et à prendre à leur compte une grande partie des dettes des institutions financières défaillantes. En conséquence, les niveaux de dette publique ont fortement augmenté, et ils vont probablement continuer à le faire dans un futur proche dans les pays de l'OCDE. Cependant, il n'y a pas de consensus sur les effets d'une dette publique, même élevée, sur l'économie. Cet article examine les contributions théoriques à ce débat. Nous nous interrogeons d'abord sur l'éventuelle existence d'une cible souhaitable de dette publique, puis nous nous intéressons aux deux plus grands risques associés à la dette publique à long terme : son impact sur la croissance et sur la stabilité du policy mix.

Nous proposons un modèle théorique simple permettant de prendre en compte l'existence de régimes d'endettement de long terme, en accord avec les faits saillants observés en longue période. Nous nous intéressons particulièrement aux effets d'une hausse permanente de la dette publique sur la croissance à long terme, et nous montrons que ces effets, toujours négatifs (on nuls), dépendent dans leur ampleur de la variable d'ajustement à la charge de la dette dans la contrainte budgétaire de l'Etat. Enfin, nous montrons qu'au contraire des effets sur la croissance, les effets sur le bien-être à long terme d'une hausse permanente de la dette publique peuvent être positifs. Nous en déduisons l'existence d'un seuil optimal pour le ratio de dette publique au PIB.

The endogenous growth literature has established the existence of an inverted-U curve between taxes and economic growth, namely a Growth Laffer Curve (GLC). We develop a growth model with public investment as the engine of perpetual growth, and look for the effect of deficit, tax and money financing on economic growth. We study in particular the way fiscal and monetary policies (through deficit and seigniorage respectively) deform the GLC. An empirical section based on a panel of developing countries provides GMM-system estimators that support our theoretical conclusions.

The forest still covers an important share of land area in many developing countries and represents an important source of revenue for governments. Another major contribution to government revenues comes from printing money, namely the seigniorage. Building on a simple theoretical model where governments target inflation and aim at reducing deforestation while minimising a welfare loss function, we exhibit the potential substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Regressions run on a panel of developing countries show that there exists a non-negligible substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues, which is, as suggested by the theoretical model, even stronger if the endogenous character of seigniorage is taken into account. Adding variables suggested by the theoretical model as well as usual control variables in deforestation equations, do not alter the main result. As a consequence, disinflation policies as recommended by the IMF, may hasten deforestation. The model is extended to address this problem, which shows that international transfers dedicated to rainforest protection may upturn the positive correlation between tighter monetary policies and deforestation and give some additional support to REDD's advocates.

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It is widely recognized that the Euro area is an asymmetric monetary union which assembles countries with heterogeneous structures on financial, goods and labour markets stricken by asymmetric shocks. However, the main objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to preserve price stability for the euro area as a whole, and the ECB pays most of its attention to union-wide output and (principally) inflation, neglecting, at least on the level of principles, inflation and output divergences in union. In this paper, we wonder, at a theoretical level, about the social loss associated with such an objective based on aggregate magnitudes, and we search for solutions, namely an “optimal” contract for a common central bank. We show in particular that it is not necessarily a good thing that a common central bank worries about inflation divergences without being concerned about output divergences in union.

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In this paper, we study maximizing long-run economic growth trade-off in monetary and fiscal policies in an endogenous growth model with transaction costs. We show that both monetary and fiscal policies are subject to threshold effects, a result that gives account of a number of recent empirical findings. Furthermore, the model shows that, to finance public expenditures, maximizing-growth government must choose relatively high seigniorage (respectively income taxation), if "tax evasion" and "financial repression" coefficients are high (respectively low). Thus, our model may explain why some governments resort to seigniorage and inflationary finance, and others rather resort to high tax-rate, as result of maximizing-growth strategies in different structural enviroments (notably concerning tax evasion and financial repression). In addition, the model allows examining how the optimal mix of government finance changes in response to different public debt contexts.

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