Pierre GAZE
GAZE
Pierre
enseignant-chercheurs
Domaine de recherche : Macroéconomie et Finance
Bureau : A221
E-mail : pierre.gaze@univ-orleans.fr
Travaux
- Publications dans des revues scientifiques
- Ouvrages et rapports
- Documents de travail et autres publications
- Communications
2020
2016
« Can a Platform Make Profit with Consumers' Mobility? A Two-Sided Monopoly Model with Random Endogenous Side-Switching »
We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. We define two periods of time. In the first period, agents buy the platform services on each side and in the second period of time, they can possibly enhance their satisfaction by going to the other face of the platform. We analyze the link between mobility, consumer’s utility, prices and profit. We show that mobility is a valuable feature which can be compared with an increase of product quality. Finally, the firm is able to capture the mobility in its monopoly’s profit. The relative size of each group then appears as a strategical variable for the firm.
Lien HAL2015
Can a Platform Make Profit with Consumer' Mobility? A Two-Sided Monopoly Model with Random Endogenous Side-Swiching
We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. We define two periods of time. In the first period, agents buy the platform services on each side and in the second period of time, they can possibly enhance their satisfaction by going to the other face of the platform. We analyze the link between mobility, consumer’s utility, prices and profit. We show that mobility is a valuable feature which can be compared with an increase of product quality. Finally, the firm is able to capture the mobility in its monopoly’s profit. The relative size of each group then appears as a strategical variable for the firm.
Lien HAL2008
Electronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: What Happens when Side-Switching is Possible?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: what Happens when Side-Switching is Possible?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HAL2003
Les conventions de services bancaires : quels enjeux pour les banquiers et leurs clients?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HAL2002
Pourquoi les banques nous proposent-elles leurs services sous forme de paquets?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HAL2008
Electronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: what Happens when Sellers and Buyers can switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: what Happens when Sellers and Buyers can switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: What Happens when Sellers and Buyers can Switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: what Happens when Sellers and Buyers can Switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: what Happens when Sellers and Buyers can Switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: what Happens when Sellers and Buyers can Switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: what Happens when Sellers and Buyers can Switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HALElectronic Intermediation and Two-Sided Markets: What Happens when Sellers and Buyers can Switch?
Résumé non disponible.
Lien HAL