Date : Mardi | 2022-12-06 à 12h30
Lieu : Salle des thèses

Sandy Suardy (University of Wollongong)

This paper examines whether a government can play an important role in determining a firm’s related party transactions associated with tunnelling. Through the lens of political turnover in 31 Chinese provinces for 2000-2018, we show that political turnover is negatively associated with state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) related party transactions (RPTs) but has no impact on non-SOEs’. Political turnover engenders uncertainty to SOEs, which curtail tunnelling-related RPTs. We identify two channels – corruption and policy-induced RPTs – leading political turnover to reduce RPTs. Corruption RPTs fall more significantly in highly corrupt provinces and before the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. Policy RPTs of SOEs with delisting risk and in high public debt provinces decrease considerably. Financially constrained firms, older officials and within-province appointments diminish the impact of political turnover on RPTs. On average, the fall in RPTs starts a year before a political turnover and ends a year after.