Date : Jeudi | 2024-01-09 à 12h30
Lieu : Salle des thèses

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Zélie GANKON SIEYADJEU (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL/Chaire Economie du Climat/Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique)

Compliance with environmental regulations relies on a nuanced understanding of both formal incentives and informal social motivations. This paper explores the effect of social and moral norms on individuals’ decisions to engage in illegal fishing activities. We develop a theoretical model that incorporates social norms and peer effects to assess the utility derived from these choices, revealing an equilibrium where only half of the individuals adhere to regulations. We then present a discrete choice model to empirically investigate the effect of these drivers on illegal fishing behaviour. A Hybrid Choice Model is specified, featuring a latent variable that captures fishing-related social norms. Using data collected in 2020 from a fishing community in Ghana, encompassing 410 fishermen, their households, and various fishing practices—including the illegal activity of Saiko fishing—we uncover key findings. Observable indicators, particularly fishermen’s perceptions of peer attitudes toward fishing bans, effectively capture the social norm. Furthermore, the fishing social norm significantly influences both fishermen's satisfaction and their decision to participate in illegal activities. Finally, we extend the analysis to the intensive margin, examining hours spent on Saiko retail and the productivity of participants. The latent score is found to be negatively associated with the intensity of Saiko retail, indicating that social norms impose a constraining effect even after the decision to engage in the activity has been made.